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Atheistic and Christian
Existentialism: A Comparison of
Sartre and Marcel
Thomas C. Anderson
Department of Philosophy, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

In Existentialism and Humanism Jean-Paul Sartre states that
there are “two kinds of existentialists,” the atheistic, in which he
includes himself, and the Christian, among whom he includes his fellow
countryman Gabriel Marcel.1 Needless to say, these two existentialists
significantly disagree on many things and yet, surprisingly, they also
have notable areas of agreement, as we shall see. The purpose of this
paper is to compare the views of the two men on a number of
important philosophical issues. My comparison is aided by the fact that
Sartre and Marcel knew each other personally and occasionally directly
commented in writing on each other’s ideas.
First, some information about their history and personal
relationship. Both men were born, Marcel in 1889, Sartre in 1905, and
for the most part lived and wrote in Paris. Marcel was sixteen years
older than Sartre and died seven years earlier, in 1973. Each of them
studied in Paris (Sartre at L’ecole normale superior, Marcel at the
Sorbonne) and after passing the agrégation held various teaching
positions in France for a few years. They probably first met at the very
popular informal philosophical gatherings Marcel hosted almost weekly
at his home beginning in the 1940s after the end of World War II.
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Marcel, Beauvoir, and others refer to those get-togethers and mention
that the young Sartre presented papers there. Marcel also says that at
that time relations among the three of them were cordial.2 In fact,
Marcel was one of the first French thinkers to review some of Sartre’s
early works and to insist that his thought was “powerful and
important.” He also stated that he was “happy and proud” to have
suggested certain topics to Sartre that he subsequently pursued.
Marcel also praised Sartre for some of his analyses of concrete
examples, especially for his “phenomenological study of the other.”3
According to Marcel, a break between them occurred because of
their sharp disagreement over the trials and purges that were carried
out in France after the second world war.4 He complained that the socalled courts of justice which tried and passed sentences on alleged
collaborators were often composed of men and women who, because
of their sufferings during the occupation, could hardly be fair and
impartial in their verdicts. Sartre and the existentialists, who were
very popular at that time, in effect supported those courts by cynically
challenging traditional principles of fairness and impartiality.
Unfortunately, the two men remained estranged for the rest of their
lives.
I should add that both men were heavily influenced by the
phenomenological movement initiated by Edmund Husserl in the early
twentieth century. The philosophical “method” each adopted consisted
in carefully reflecting on and describing phenomena (acts of
consciousness or their objects) as they appear and are lived in
ordinary human experiences of our self and of our world. The goal of
such descriptions is ultimately to bring to light the essential structures
of what is present in experience.
My procedure in discussing some major areas of philosophical
disagreement between the two will be as follows:
A. I will set out positions that Sartre apparently adopts and
explain why he adopts them.
B. I will present Marcel’s criticism of those positions and offer
his alternative(s).
C. I will evaluate the validity of Marcel’s criticisms.

Ontology
A. Sartre’s position: I begin with Sartre’s classification of being
set forth in Being and Nothingness and other early works. As the result
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of what he claims is phenomenological analysis, he divides all reality
into just two realms, being-for-itself (human consciousness) and
being-in-itself.5 Consciousness is described as nonsubstantial and
contentless, that is, as “entirely activity and spontaneity,” “selfdetermining,” “self-activated” and, therefore, free.6 Being-in-itself, on
the other hand, is passive and inert, so identical with itself and filled
with being that it is a totally undifferentiated, full positivity of being.
These two realms are “absolutely separated regions of being,” Sartre
claims, because being-in-itself is so filled with being “that it does not
enter into any connection with what is not itself.” It is “isolated in its
being.”7 While he grants that there are relations which in a sense unite
the two kinds of being, such relations are only one way. Only
consciousness is related to being inasmuch as it exists only as
consciousness of being. Being in itself has no relation with
consciousness nor, strictly speaking, even with itself. It simply “is
itself‟ and “glued to itself‟ as a full positivity of being.8
One important result of Sartre’s definition of being in itself as
one with itself and “isolated” in its being is that being for itself, human
consciousness, is totally free from any influence of being in itself. The
relation of consciousness to being is entirely negative. “Consciousness
of something” ultimately involves “not being that being” and this,
Sartre says, preserves consciousness from being affected by the
beings it is aware of.9
Accordingly, when we turn to his most extensive treatment of
freedom and its relation to other things and people in Part IV, Chapter
One of Being and Nothingness, we find Sartre insisting on the total
freedom of consciousness or being for itself and of human reality. He
minimizes to the point of denial any limitations of human freedom and
speaks of it as “absolute,” “total,” “infinite,” and “without limits.” Note
the following statement: “Man can not be sometimes slave and
sometimes free; he is wholly and forever free or he is not free at all.”10
B. Marcel’s criticism: Marcel objects to Sartre’s division of reality
into two realms of being absolutely separate from each other and he
also rejects Sartre’s claim that he arrived at that division by
phenomenological analysis. On the basis of his own reflections on
experience, Marcel denies that human reality is isolated from the
things of this world and that worldly things have no impact on human
beings and their consciousnesses. He insists instead on their
“participation” with each other, meaning by that that humans are
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neither isolated from things of the world nor from other human beings
but are essentially connected to both. The result is that things can not
only affect and change me externally (e.g. fire can burn me), they can
affect me “internally” in my thoughts, feelings, and choices. Every
human being is to some degree in union with or bound to what is not
oneself. We are “beings-in-the-world,” he states, and so are
fundamentally dependent on others and on the world. Our being is
totally exposed, vulnerable, and permeable to the things and people
among which we exist.11 “I am in the world,” he writes, “only insofar
as the world ... [is] something shaping me as in a womb” and a kind of
“primordial bond ... unites the human being to a particular,
determined, and concrete environment.”12 The concrete situations of
our lives are not objective facts which exist independent of us. The
person I am and have become is to a great extent the result of the
particular circumstances with which I have lived and interacted
throughout the course of my life. Of course, the other human beings I
have encountered, in particular my family and friends, have especially
influenced me externally and internally. Thus, Marcel categorically
rejects Being and Nothingness’s claim that human freedom is total,
unlimited, and absolute. Reflection on the given facts of human
experience have not forced Sartre to his conclusions, he states, his
ontological presuppositions have.13 An unbiased look at our lived
experience reveals that human beings and their freedoms are affected
and limited, sometimes severely, by the many people and things they
encounter in the world.
C. Evaluation of Marcel’s criticisms: I believe that Marcel’s
critiques of the ontology of Being and Nothingness are well taken. But
I must immediately add that by 1960, when the Critique of Dialectical
Reason was published, Sartre had made it abundantly clear that he
himself had significantly modified much of his earlier ontology and its
description of two separate realms of being. While he generally
continues to divide reality into human beings and nonhuman things, he
affirms his agreement with Marx that the relations between human
organisms and each other and the world are dialectical in nature. That
is, there is mutual interaction and causation between humans and the
world and that can significantly restrict an individual’s freedom.
Indeed, the Critique’s purpose, Sartre says, is to show the presence of
the dialectic in human history starting from humans acting on the
world to fulfill their needs and the things of the world in turn acting or
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reacting on human beings.14 The hundreds of pages of the Critique
contain an abundance of illustrations of the myriad dialectical relations
between human beings and the physical world and other human
beings and the social, political, economic, and cultural structures they
create. Lest there be any doubt, Sartre explicitly repudiates his earlier
view that human freedom is absolute or unlimited: “it would be quite
wrong to interpret me as saying that man is free in all situations ... I
mean the exact opposite: all men are slaves insofar as their life
unfolds in the practico-inert field,” that is, in the field comprised of
physical things and sodal structures shaped by human activity. He
mentions such things as one’s class, standard of living, type of work,
specific culture. In general the practico-inert is “a determinate
provision of material and intellectual tools; it is a strictly limited field
of possibilities.”15
The conclusion to draw, then, is that Marcel’s (and many
others‟) criticisms of Sartre‟ s early ontology in Being and Nothingness
while accurate, do not apply to Sartre’s later, 1960, dialectical vision of
reality, a vision which explicitly rejected the description of two
separate regions of being he set forth earlier. No doubt, the criticisms
that Marcel and others made of that bifurcation of being were at least
partly responsible for the changes Sartre made in his ontology.16

The Nature and Source of Value
A. Sartre’s position: In Being and Nothingness Sartre makes it
very clear that he believes all values are human creations. He rejects
what he calls “the spirit of seriousness,” the view that some values are
objective or, as he puts it, “written in things.” Seriousness maintains
that justice and honesty, for example, possess value independent of
human choices or desires. It also claims that human beings have
intrinsic value. In other words, even if no one chooses to value justice
or to value human beings, the serious person insists they possess
objective, inherent worth. For the spirit of seriousness, individual
values are “transcendent givens independent of human subjectivity.”17
Sartre, for his part, calls people cowards in bad faith who, in
order to avoid recognizing their freedom, hide from themselves the
fact that man “is the being by whom values exist” and that “his
freedom [is] ... the unique source of value.”18 In his essay
“Existentialism and Humanism” Sartre roots the absence of objective
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values in atheism. There is no God to create or decree anything to be
of value. I will quote him at some length:
The [atheistic] existentialist...thinks it very distressing that God
does not exist, because all possibility of finding values in a
heaven of ideas disappears along with Him .... Nowhere is it
written that the good exists, that we must be honest, that we
must not lie, because the fact is we are now on a plane where
there are only men.
And he goes on to point out the consequences: “Dostoevsky
said, ‘If God did not exist, everything would be permitted.’ That is the
very starting point for existentialism. Indeed, everything is permissible
if God does not exist.”19
Sartre is equally clear in Being and Nothingness about what
results from the denial of objective values. Since only human freedom
is the source of values, he writes, that “paralyzes” and “relativizes”
ethics, for it means that whatever one freely chooses to value,
whether justice or injustice, will thereby be of value. “My freedom is
the sole foundation of values,” he claims, and as a result “nothing,
absolutely nothing justifies me in adopting this or that particular value,
this or that particular scale of values.”20 I cannot appeal to any
objective value criterion, such as God’s law, to justify the values I
choose since that criterion itself would be of value only if I freely
choose it to be.
In his more technical discussion of the nature and source of
values in Being and Nothingness, Sartre argues that values are
experienced as norms or imperatives and as such they are not real but
demands to be made real. Values are not facts or what is the case but
norms expressing what should be. But if values are demands beyond
what is, their reality can come only from a being that can go beyond
what is and grasp what is not. Such a being is, of course, being for
itself or human consciousness insofar as it is free to transcend what is
and grasp what is not. Hence human freedom is the source of all
values.21
B. Marcel’s criticisms: There are basically two criticisms of
Sartre’s subjectivist position on values offered by Marcel. The first is
the very traditional one which argues that the consequences would be
disastrous if all values are only the creation of human freedom. “The
way would then lie open to the worst abuses and abominations”22 for
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one could freely choose to value sexual abuse, slavery, and genocide.
To be sure, others could freely choose to value love, justice, and
peace. But there would be absolutely no basis for claiming that one set
of values is any better (more valuable) than another. As Sartre says,
“nothing justifies me in adopting this or that value, this or that set of
values.” Simply put, if all values are created by human freedom, then
anything, no matter how horrific, could be made valuable by that
freedom.
Marcel’s second criticism is from a phenomenological
perspective, a perspective which, as we have noted, Sartre himself
claims to adopt. If we reflect honestly on our experiences of values,
Marcel claims, we will find that we do not experience them to be our
free creations but we recognize them as imposed on us: “If I examine
myself honestly and without reference to any preconceived body of
ideas, I find that I do not “choose‟ my values at all but that I
recognize them.” Indeed, “value is essentially something which does
not allow itself to be chosen.”23 I understand that to mean that when I
experience or recognize something as valuable, such as the lives of
innocent children, and, therefore, morally condemn enslaving them,
my experience/recognition is that the value of those children is not up
to my free choice. Rather, their value appears in them, whether one
chooses to recognize it or not, and even if one wishes it weren’t there.
If Sartre were correct and values were my free creations, I could
simply choose not to value the lives of those innocent children and
they would then possess no value. (I might refuse to confer value on
them in order to avoid any personal responsibility for defending them.)
But when children’s lives appear to me to possess values, my
experience is that those lives demand to be recognized and defended.
Even if I turn my back on them, their intrinsic value continues to tug
at me.
Perhaps a stronger argument for the objective reality of values
can be found in Marcel’s reflections on human experiences of loving
fidelity.24 He notes that some people commit themselves
unconditionally to faithfully love other human beings, such as their
spouses, children, and friends, even to the extent of putting their lives
on the line for them. Others commit themselves unconditionally to
causes such as freedom or peace and are willing to live and die for
them. Now what could explain why some offer pledges of unconditional
fidelity and love to other humans or to causes? Marcel answers that
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unconditional loving fidelity makes sense only if those who make such
commitments experience the presence of unconditional value in those
people or causes. Furthermore, those values must be intrinsically
present in my spouse and children or in peace for if they issue from
human freedom as Sartre claims, then they can be removed by human
freedom. As I said above, if it became too dangerous for me to assign
value to something or someone, I could simply freely decide that they
have no value and they would have none. Indeed, to offer
unconditional love and fidelity to someone or something whose value
comes from human freedom and so can be removed by human
freedom seems foolish in the extreme. Those who pledge themselves
unconditionally to others and /or causes are fundamentally deluded
and foolish. In a Sartrean universe the most heroic human acts of selfsacrifice are utterly incomprehensible. How can Sartre praise the
heroes of the French resistance movement during WWII and condemn
the Nazis, Marcel asks, if there are no objective values such as
courage and justice?25 I might add that Sartre’s own efforts on behalf
of the Algerian freedom fighters, efforts which he undertook in
conditions which posed great danger to his life, also seem hard to
reconcile with his claim that nothing has objective or intrinsic value.
C. Evaluation of Marcel’s criticisms: Twenty years after the
publication of his 1943 phenomenological ontology, in 1964, Sartre
presented a public lecture in Rome in which he set out at some length
what he later called his second ethics. That designation distinguished it
from his first ethics written in the 1940s and based on Being and
Nothingness. He begins this public lecture by stating that the “central
fact” of moral experience is its normative character. Every moral
prescription, imperative, value and norm which we experience
presents itself to us as demanding our obedience. Values and norms
appear to us as moral duties, requirements, and obligations which we
should follow and obey. They are not descriptions of facts but
prescriptions of conduct.26 Thus, by the time of this later work, Sartre
agrees with Marcel that values are experienced as prescriptions
imposed on us and not as our free creations. What, he asks, is the
source of these values/norms? He answers, human needs: “The root of
morality is in need.”27 Needs, Sartre explains, are not just the lack of
something or other. They are felt exigencies, felt (at least obscurely)
demands for satisfaction. Since we have various needs which demand
to be satisfied, we experience certain objects (e.g. food, health,
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knowledge, love) to be valuable and so to be norms and demands that
we should attempt to realize. Ultimately we experience the human
organism itself with needs fulfilled as our normative future, that is, as
the highest end and supreme value we should obtain. “Need posits
man as his own end,” Sartre states. Note that that ultimate end, norm
and value, the human being with its needs satisfied, is not something
we freely select or can reject; it is “given” and “imposed” (Sartre’s
terms) on us by our needs.”28
Furthermore, since humans are a specific kind of organism
having specific needs, certain specific kinds of objects are necessary to
fulfill those needs. Since we do not freely choose the needs we have,
we can not freely choose the general kind of things which fulfill those
needs. Sartre mentions needs for oxygen and protein, for freedom and
love, for other human beings and culture, for a meaningful life. And it
is because we need them that oxygen, protein, freedom, love, culture,
and so forth are experienced by us as having to be attained, that is, as
values and norms. Again, these are “given,” “assigned,” and “imposed”
on us, Sartre asserts.29
Clearly, then, in the 1960s Sartre grants an objectivity to values
that his earlier work did not. That objectivity does not come from
some transcendent being or realm, it issues from our actual human
needs. That objectivity gives values/norms an independence from
human freedom since our choices can neither create nor remove the
value of certain objects. Protein and love are valuable for the organism
we are whether or not we freely choose them to be or want them to
be.
We have here, then, another instance where Marcel’s criticisms
of Sartre’s ideas apply only to the early Sartre and his early ontology.
It may be that those criticisms were noted by Sartre and helped to
prompt the change in his understanding of the source and nature of
values. In any case, rooting values in human needs is significantly
different from considering them to be the creations of human
freedom.30
Still, there remains a difference between the two men in the
“seriousness,” to use Sartre’s term, which each ascribes to values.
Rooting them in human needs is different from grounding them in a
Creator of human beings as Marcel does. While he would certainly
applaud Sartre’s move granting more objectivity to values, I suspect
Marcel would still maintain that he has not fully accounted for their
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prescriptive, normative, obligatory character and in particular for the
unconditional, unlimited value that human beings themselves possess.
For Sartre human beings are objectively of value because their
fulfillment, the satisfaction of their needs, is in fact their ultimate goal.
For Marcel finite human beings ultimately possess unconditional value
because they are gifts of a being who is infinite value itself, namely a
loving creator, an absolute Thou.31 (More on this in Section V.) In the
final analysis human beings remain the source of all values, including
their own, for Sartre. Because the value of human beings is God given
for Marcel, humans have significantly more worth and dignity in his
universe. Likewise, since the ultimate source of their value and dignity
is God, not human beings, the obligation to respect human beings and
promote their well-being is, I would think, much stronger and more
serious in Marcel’s world than it is in Sartre’s.

The Meaning of Life
A. Sartre’s position: In the final pages of Being and Nothingness
Sartre draws some grim conclusions from the view of human reality he
has set forth in that work. He reviews something he established
earlier, namely, that the ultimate value and goal humans seek is to be
God. Insofar as human reality is radically unnecessary, contingent, it
desires to be necessary. As he puts it, we want to exist “by right, “not
as we do, purely “by chance.” At the same time, in order to preserve
our freedom, we want to give ourselves this right or necessity. If we
receive necessity from some external cause such as God, that would
make us simply a pawn in his cosmic plan. Now to desire to be a being
who would justify its own existence by causing itself to be necessary
and not by chance, is to desire to be a being which would cause itself
to be, an ens causa sui, which Sartre calls God. Of course, a being that
would be both necessary and free is impossible because selfcontradictory. And so he concludes that our fundamental desire to be
God, to be a being which would freely cause itself to be necessary, is
in vain, a “useless passion.” Since there is no way we can fulfill that
passion, the result is that “human reality is by nature an unhappy
consciousness with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state.”32
We are condemned to despair; for all human activities are
equivalent (for they all tend to sacrifice man in order that the
self-cause may arise and all are on principle doomed to failure).
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Thus it amounts to the same thing whether one gets drunk
alone or is a leader of nations.33
In other words, no matter how we attempt to be God, that is, to
cause ourselves to exist by necessity, by right rather than by chance,
whether it be drugs or political power or anything else, we are doomed
to fail. When all is said and done we have no reason for our existence,
we are contingent, entirely by chance.
B. Marcel’s criticism: In his reviews of Sartre’s early works
Marcel often cites Sartre’s statements (such as those in the previous
section) that human existence is “doomed to failure.” He recognizes
that in Being and Nothingness Sartre comes to that conclusion because
he believes that every human being seeks an unreachable goal, the
“divinisation of himself” by “attaining to the dignity of the selfcause.”34 Not only this but as we saw in the previous section the early
Sartre holds that nothing, not even human beings, possesses any
inherent value or dignity. Accordingly, Marcel labels Sartre’s position
“nihilism” and says that it expresses a “degraded view” which
“devalues” human existence. It is a “systematic vilification of man,” for
“to vilify a thing is to take away its value.” Using unusually strong
language, Marcel writes, “It is not at all surprising that in it [Sartre’s
philosophy] man should conceive of himself more and more as waste
matter or as potential excrement!”35
C. Evaluation of Marcel’s criticism: It is true that Sartre never
wavers in believing that human beings naturally desire the
unattainable goal of being the total cause of themselves so that they
exist by right, by necessity. However, contrary to what Marcel thinks,
Sartre does not agree that seeking that impossible goal must render
human life valueless or meaningless or doomed to failure. Rather, by
our own free choices and those of others we can create meaningful,
valuable lives for ourselves and others. Sartre makes this very clear in
his early essay, “Existentialism and Humanism,” written three years
after Being and Nothingness. “Life has no meaning a priori,” he states,
“it’s up to you to give it meaning, and value is nothing else but the
meaning you choose.”36 Even though human life possesses no
objective or intrinsic value or meaning, we ourselves can freely confer
value on it. Recall that in his early ontology Sartre argued that human
freedom is the only source of values. It follows, then, that if humans
freely choose to value their lives, those lives will become valuable. In
his Notebooks for an Ethics (written in the late 40s, published
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posthumously) he puts this in terms of justification. Human beings can
justify their lives, he says, by undertaking conversion, which means by
ceasing to value, or working to attain, the impossible causa sui and
choosing instead to give value to attainable goals such as human life
itself.37 More specifically, he recommends that we choose to value and
promote the corning of a classless society embodying democratic
socialism, also called “the city of ends.” This would be a society where
everyone chooses to confer value on his/her own existence and on
everyone else‟s.38
In his last work, The Family Idiot, he takes the same position.
As unnecessary and finite, human beings seek a meaning and purpose
to their lives that would confer necessity on them. We desire the
absolute, the infinite, Sartre writes, a mandate for our lives that comes
from an infinite being who created us for some purpose in his grand
design and thereby justifies our being. He labels this desire the
“religious instinct” and, of course, says it can not be satisfied:
“Finitude makes them [creatures] mad for an unattainable infinite,” he
states. “Being created us in such a way that we can neither find it nor
give up the search.”39 Once again it remains up to human beings
themselves to confer meaning and purpose on their lives: “sense and
non-sense in a human life are human in principle and come to the child
of man from man himself.” The most meaningful lives we can achieve
will be ones where we cooperate to create our common humanity by
constructing societies that fulfill our common human needs.40
Thus Marcel’s criticism that Sartre is a nihilist who degrades and
vilifies human existence by denying it any value and dooming it to
failure and meaninglessness is flagrantly wrong. At no time in his life
did Sartre believe that human beings were inevitably doomed to
valueless, meaningless lives. As we have seen, in his early ontology he
insisted that humans themselves can make their lives meaningful and
in later works he argued that was best accomplished by human beings
working together to fulfill their needs. That being said, it also remains
true that throughout his life Sartre maintained that the ultimate goal
humans desire is to be God or to possess a totally justified existence,
and that is not achievable. Since that is the case, I suspect that Marcel
would continue to insist that in the final analysis human existence for
Sartre is fated to be in despair and doomed to failure. While together
we ourselves certainly can confer on our lives a richness of meaning
and value, that can not cover up the fact that at the deepest level of
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our being we long for a fullness of meaning and a complete
justification of our existence that we can never attain.

Human Relations
A. Sartre’s position: To say that Being and Nothingness dwells
on the negative side of relations among human beings is an
understatement. Sartre describes there many human interactions in
great detail and argues that in every case, including love, they are
attempts of one or more subjects to dominate or be dominated by
others. Accordingly, he insists that conflict is the fundamental relation
among subjects. “Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others,”
he writes, „„the essence of the relations between consciousnesses is
not the Mitsein, it is conflict.”41
On the ontological level, Sartre emphasizes conflict in order to
stress the irreducible separateness of each individual from others, a
separateness that can never be overcome by merging consciousnesses
together into some supra-individual union. “So long as
consciousnesses exist,” he asserts, “the separation and conflict of
consciousnesses will remain.”42
On the epistemological level, he believes that for one subject to
be aware of another subject necessarily involves grasping that other
subject as a thing-like object—and that is a degradation of him or her.
Sartre also calls the objectification of another subject an “alienation”
and “enslavement” of him or her. It is a degradation, alienation, and
enslavement because the other free subject cannot control how I
objectify it, that is, the other’s freedom cannot control how I evaluate
and judge him or her.43 And since neither subject wants to be turned
into a thing-like object, conflict between them is inevitable. It is
inevitable too because no subject-to-subject relation between human
beings is possible. Either I recognize the other as a free subject who
objectifies and degrades me or I recognize myself as a free subject
who objectifies and degrades the other. “No synthesis of these two
forms is possible,” Sartre maintains. To apprehend the other as both a
free subject and an object is an “impossible ideal.” “We shall never
place ourselves ... on the plane where the recognition of the other’s
freedom would involve the other’s recognition of our freedom.” Thus,
he concludes his detailed descriptions of concrete human relations
from love to hate by reasserting, “It is useless, therefore, for human
reality to seek to get out of this dilemma: one must either transcend
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[objectify] the other or allow oneself to be transcended [objectified] by
him.”44 This is summed up in his famous line, “the essence of the
relations between consciousnesses is not the Mitsein, it is conflict.”
B. Marcel’s criticisms: Marcel is just one of a countless number
of commentators who objected that Being and Nothingness’s
descriptions of human relations were extremely one-sided. While he
concedes that some of Sartre’s analyses are “masterful,” Marcel is
particularly critical of his description of love even going so far as to say
that the author of Being and Nothingness “has nowhere succeeded
...in conceiving it [love].”45 Since he admits no possibility of subject to
subject relations, love for Sartre is just one of many attempts of a free
subject to dominate another.
As we just saw, all human relations are of the subject to object
kind for Sartre and to make an object of a subject is to reify it and,
therefore, to degrade, alienate, and enslave it. One of Marcel’s
responses to Sartre is simply that not all objectification of another
involves a degradation of them or an enslavement of their freedom. I
can be conscious of another (and, therefore, make them my object)
with approval, respect, and love, and desire to assist them in
becoming more free. Love, in particular, is not an attempt to dominate
others or to control their freedom, Marcel says, but an attempt to
enter into communion with them, to participate in their very being.
Love is a true subject-to-subject or intersubjective relation.46 One of
Marcel’s preferred ways of expressing that intersubjectivity is to
designate love in all its forms (friendship, filial, maternal, etc.) as an Ithou rather than an I-you or I-him/her/it relation. The latter are
subject to object relations; I-thou are subject to subject. (The English
word thou is used to translate the familiar and intimate form of the
pronoun you in French, tu instead of vous.) Furthermore, for Marcel Ithou relations involve a real union or communion of subjects, a union
which recognizes the other subject “as a being endowed with a dignity
and reality of his [and her] own.”47 This is precisely the kind of
relationship which Sartre says is impossible.
To emphasize the union or bond between subjects present in
love, Marcel speaks of “the indistinctness of the I and the thou” and
states that love relations transcend the “categories of the same and
the other.” That is, subjects united in love do not fuse into one and the
same being and yet they are not separate or distinct from each other.
They are really united in a “suprapersonal unity,” Marcel states, but it
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is a unity which promotes the integrity and well being of each person.
Each lover’s being is enhanced by sharing and participating in the life
and experiences of the beloved. Neither is diminished or destroyed for
each lover respects the reality of the beloved and desires his/her
fulfillment. All this Marcel claims is revealed by an unbiased
phenomenological description oflove.48 But, of course, Sartre too
claims to use the phenomenological method. Why, then, does the
author of Being and Nothingness deny the possibility of subject-tosubject relations and unions?
Marcel believes that it is because Sartre conceives all
interpersonal unions, including love, as material or physical in
character. A physical union of two or more entities involves a physical
modification or even destruction of one or both of them, as in a
chemical or biological reaction. When a lion physically “unites” with a
lamb by eating it, the latter is no longer a separate living organism but
part of the lion. Just so, if love’s intersubjective union is considered to
be physical, then it will be viewed as an attempt to modify and control
others, if not to destroy them—as Sartre does.49
Love should rather be understood as a spiritual union, Marcel
says. It is a genuine union but not one which physically disturbs the
lover or the beloved. My wife does not change color or gain an inch or
lose a pound from our loving bond. Of course, our spiritual oneness
will affect each of us internally since we participate in each other’s
lives. My wife’s joys and sorrows, her search for meaning and
happiness truly become part of me and my life. Yet at the same time
my love recognizes and affirms her as she is; after all it is she that I
know and love.
C. Evaluation of Marcel’s criticisms: Sartre’s posthumous
publication, Notebooks for an Ethics, makes it perfectly clear that he
never intended to claim that the conflictual relations described in the
ontology of Being and Nothingness were the only possible human
relations. In the Notebooks he acknowledges that subjects can relate
to each other primarily as subjects, or more precisely as subject/object
to subject/object (since we can’t totally avoid objectifying others).
Notebooks also recognizes that to objectify other subjects does not
inevitably degrade or alienate or enslave them, provided that we
recognize them first and foremost as free subjects.50 Perhaps most
important Sartre explicitly states there that Being and Nothingness
was not an attempt to set forth the necessary structure of all human
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relations but only those of unconverted individuals, individuals who
attempt to use or to eliminate others in order to become causa sui,
God. If one recognizes the futility of pursuing that unattainable goal,
he or she can undertake a ,conversion which as we saw in the previous
section means the refusal to value or seek becoming God and hence
the refusal to try and use others to attain that end. Early in his
Notebooks, Sartre states that “the struggle of consciousnesses only
makes sense before conversion.” After conversion “there is no
ontological reason to stay on the level of struggle.” And in an explicit
reference to Being and Nothingness, he asserts that conversion can
transform the “hell” of human relations described there.51
In Notebooks Sartre also urges the adoption of an attitude of
generosity toward others by which he means an attitude of willing and
assisting them in achieving their freely chosen goals. He labels this
attitude “authentic love” in order to clearly distinguish it from the love
described in the earlier work. Furthermore, Sartre says, authentic love
consists of unity between persons, “a certain kind of interpenetration
of freedoms” where “each freedom is wholly in the other one.” This
unity, he explains, overcomes radical separation and otherness:
“otherness is replaced by unity, even though ontically, otherness
always remains.” Otherness always remains because the unity in
authentic love, Sartre insists, is not an ontological fusion of individual
subjects into one supraindividual being but is rather a unity on the
plane of will and action.52 I will return to this point below.
Sartre’s recognition and appreciation of the positive side of
human relations reaches its culmination in his last major work, The
Family Idiot. There he describes in great detail our basic human need
to be loved (authentically), respected and valued by others. Only if we
are loved can we come to value and love ourselves and believe that we
have a mandate for our existence and that our lives have purpose.53
Thus, I believe that Marcel’s criticism that Sartre recognizes
only the negative side of human relations is not accurate since Sartre
never intended to say that all relationships were of that kind. Marcel
was not aware that Sartre’s descriptions of human relations in Being
and Nothingness were to be taken as descriptions of relations between
unconverted individuals; although I must add that Sartre did give
some hints of that in Being and Nothingness, hints that almost none of
his contemporaries caught.54 Once the latter’s Notebooks for an Ethics
were published, seven years after Marcel’s death and three after
New Perspectives in Sartre, (2010): pg. 44-63. Publisher Link. This article is © Cambridge Scholars Publishing and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Cambridge Scholars Publishing
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express
permission from Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

16

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Sartre’s, it was abundantly clear that he, like Marcel, believed that
positive human relations (such as authentic love and generosity) were
not only possible but absolutely necessary for human beings to have
meaningful lives.
Still, while both men are in agreement about the importance of
human love, I should note that there is an important difference
between the two men’s understanding of the bond of love. For Sartre
the unity of lovers occurs only in will and action, that is, lovers choose
and act for each other’s well being. A real ontological bond between
them is impossible. For Marcel, human love does consist of a real
union between the lovers, a oneness which is spiritual in nature for it
unites the subjects together at the same time that it respects and
enhances the integrity and well being of each of them.

God
I will conclude by addressing the most profound disagreement
between Sartre and Marcel-the reality of God.
A. Sartre’s position: Actually, the atheistic existentialist does not
spend much time attempting to prove that God does not exist. His
argument is basically that the very idea of God is self-contradictory,
but that, of course, depends entirely on what he means by God.
Technically, Sartre defines God as an impossible combination of beingfor-itself and being-in-itself. God would be a being that is conscious
and free on the one hand, which he calls “nonbeing” since it is the
polar opposite of being-in-itself, combined with the total fullness of
being-in-itself on the other. Since being for itself, free human
consciousness, is defined as a lack or nothingness of being, it can not
survive if it combines with being in itself which is a complete fullness
of being.55
Sartre also defines God as an ens causa sui, a being what would
freely cause itself to be necessary or, to put it another way, a being
which makes itself necessary by freely conferring on itself a right to
be. However, Sartre argues that in order to cause itself to be
necessary, God must first (ontologically not temporally) be and so the
God-cause at the origin of God-caused would not itself be caused but
be contingent and unnecessary. Thus he writes, “God if he exists [as
causa sui] is contingent.”56 But a contingent being cannot cause itself
to be necessary for the idea of a being which is both contingent and
necessary is self-contradictory.
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Needless to say, if one does not accept Sartre’s division of
reality into being-for itself and being-in-itself, and as we saw in
Section I Marcel does not, and does not consider the impossible
combination of them to be God, and Marcel does not, Sartre’s
reasoning is not convincing. Likewise, if one does not accept ens causa
sui as a definition of God, and Marcel does not, Sartre’s argument that
such a God is impossible is irrelevant.
In my opinion, Sartre’s more cogent and challenging reasons for
denying God’s existence are found in his attack on the traditional
notion of God as the creator of all that is. He argues that there are
only two ways to understand creation and neither of them make
sense.57 Either God creates something remains within his being and
then it is not a creature which possesses own existence, and so it
simply “dissolves” in its creator. Or God creates something which is
truly “distinct from and opposed to its creator” but then it possesses
its own “being beyond the creation.” Such a being, truly distinct its
creator, Sartre states, “is its own support, it does not preserve the
trace of divine creation.” In other words, he denies the possibility that
could create a creature truly distinct or separate from himself whose
would remain totally and continuously dependent on him. That is the
Sartre claims that the theory of perpetual creation, namely, the view a
creature is continuously created at each moment of its existence,
removes all substantiality or independence of that creature from its
creator.58 Again, if God creates something that is continuously
dependent on him every moment of its being, then that created thing
can not be really separate or distinct from its creator. Apparently, in
Sartre’s eyes a creature must be completely independent of its creator
for it to have its own being distinct from that creator.
But why couldn’t something be created to be distinct from its
creator at the same time that its being is totally dependent on its
creator? Sartre suggests another argument based on passivity and
activity.59 If a being continually receives all that it is from a creator,
that makes it totally passive in relation to its creator. However, a being
that is totally passive does not even exercise its own particular
existence. For something to be in itself a being really separate and
distinct from its creator, it has to have and to exercise its own
existence, it cannot just be part of the creator’s existence. But if it
assumes and exercises its own being and thus actually is distinct from
its creator’s being, then it cannot be totally passive and so cannot be
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created. Sartre cannot see how a creature that receives everything
that it is at every moment can possess any intrinsic independence or
reality of its own in relation to its creator.
B. Marcel’s alternative: I use the term alternative here rather
than criticism because Marcel does not directly address any of Sartre’s
arguments against creation. In fact, he too has serious reservations
about the traditional understanding of creation, in particular its use of
the category of causality to explain God’s production of creatures. He
seems to consider causality to involve a determined relation between
physical objects; a cause is a physical entity which transmits a certain
power or force that modifies another physical entity.60 Yet he
recognizes that physical powers are not the only kind of powers human
beings experience. We speak of the power of truth, the power of art,
the power of love, and it is in terms of that last power that Marcel tries
to explain the nature of Divine creation.
He suggests that we view the relation between a creator God
and creatures not in tenns of causality but as the bestowing of a gift.
That is, the creator is not a first cause but a loving father whose
creatures are his freely offered gifts. To call creatures gifts is to say
that they are neither deserved, nor required, nor necessitated. Their
reality is bestowed freely, gratuitously, and generously by infinite
love.61 And he attempts to understand creation out of love by
reflecting on our experience of human love. As we saw in Section IV,
Marcel’s description of human love reveals that it is a power, in the
sense that it has real effects on the loved one and the lover, yet it is
not a power which tries to dominate or control the beloved. Love
respects the beloved and seeks to enhance his or her being. When I
realize I am loved, I experience that I am not a solitary individual
doomed to search alone for a meaningful live. I have companions,
friends, lovers who value me and join with me to support my search
for fulfillment and happiness. Another’s love refreshes me and renews
my energy; it may empower me to attempt to attain goals I would
never have the courage to attempt on my own. It may reveal and
strengthen dimensions of myself (e.g. my gentleness, my kindness,
my commitment and perseverance) that I hardly realized I possessed.
Most especially, another’s love of me reveals that I possess value, that
my life has significance beyond what I alone can give it.
Yet at the same time that love affects the beloved in the ways
just mentioned, love also respects the integrity of the beloved. As we
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noted above, Marcel believes that love is a spiritual union between
lover and beloved. The lover identifies his or her self with the beloved
and participates in his or her life and experiences. And such
participation does not absorb or destroy the beloved but respects the
beloved as he or she is—after all, it is he or she that I love. My love
seeks to promote the other. It is the beloved’s well-being and
happiness that I seek and join with my own.
Accordingly, to view creative love as analogous to human love,
as Marcel does, is to view God as a loving father whose all powerful
love wills all things into being and at the same time voluntarily
withholds itself for the good of its creatures. Just as human love seeks
the well being of the beloved, absolute creative love respects the gifts
it bestows and seeks their good, even to the point of allowing human
freedom to reject that love and its gifts.
C. Sartre’s response: Sartre never directly addresses Marcel’s
notion of creation. However, as we saw in the previous section, in his
Notebooks he does describe generosity and authentic love as both
respecting others and as assisting them in attaining their goals. In The
Family Idiot the love of others is a power which is essential for us to
fulfill our needs and live a meaningful life; it is not a power which
diminishes our freedom but one which enhances it. Sartre does not
pursue this beyond the human realm, although he does speak of our
religious instinct which is a desire deep within us for a meaning for our
lives that would make us essential to something or someone that is
absolute. We desire a justification for our lives, he says, that could
come only from an almighty, infinite being who created us for some
purpose in his grand design. One very interesting feature of our need
for a creator in Sartre’s last work is that it does not appear to be
identical to the earlier desire to be God which he described in Being
and Nothingness. The religious instinct is described as a need for
justification and meaning given by a loving creator, not a need to be a
creator who is cause of itself. Of course Sartre’s atheism has no room
for any God and so our religious instinct cannot be satisfied. Still, since
he acknowledges our complete dependence on the love of others for
our fulfillment and also recognizes that that love is not inimical to our
freedom and our flourishing, he has less reason to be suspicious of a
God like Marcel’s who creates entirely out of love.
One final remark. I trust that this paper has made it clear that
most of Marcel’s criticisms of Sartre’s views apply only to the latter’s
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early ontology set forth primarily in Being and Nothingness. It may be
that those criticisms were a stimulus for some of the changes Sartre
made in that ontology. In any case, one thing is certain, Marcel was
dead wrong when he wrote in 1946 that Sartre would never “put forth
the heroic effort ...required for a serious reconsideration” of his early
views and that “his views will harden still further.”62 Whatever one
thinks of Sartre, I believe he must be given a great deal of credit for
having the courage to reconsider and revise his views, sometimes
radically, as he continued to acquire greater insight into the human
condition.
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